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Holmes and the Bald Man:                                             
Why Rule of Reason Should Be the Standard in Sherman 
Act Section 2 Cases 
WILLIAM J. MICHAEL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It can prohibit a firm from adding capacity in anticipation of an in-
crease in demand for the firm’s product.1  Filing false papers with the gov-
ernment can run afoul of its prohibitions.2  Deceptive conduct may violate 
it.3  A firm can be liable for treble damages under it for tortious conduct.4  
Bribing competitors’ employees to shift business or divulge trade secrets 
can get a firm in trouble under it,5 as can buying up rivals’ necessary in-
puts.6 
That said, the United States Supreme Court and the brightest scholars 
are not even sure of its purpose.7  Courts and commentators recognize their 
  
 *  B.A. in Economics, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State University.  Mr. Michael 
practices antitrust law with Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP in Columbus, Ohio. 
 1. See U.S. v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 2. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 3. See Natl. Assn. of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d 904, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Intl. Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curium) (holding that exclusionary conduct was proven where 
Microsoft deceived Java developers about whether using Microsoft’s development tools would make 
software incompatible with rival operating systems); see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (holding that a conspiracy to spread false information about rival 
product safety is anticompetitive); Am. Socy. of Mech. Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 
(1982) (same). 
 4. See e.g. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 5. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 6. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
 7. See e.g. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 127 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that one purpose of the Clayton Act is to protect small business); Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through 
the protection of viable, small, locally owned business.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher 
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.”); Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (“The end sought was the prevention of restraints . . . 
which . . . raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of 
goods and services.”); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing efficiency 
gains not passed on to consumers); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 107-15 (Basic Books 1978) 
(total wealth maximization); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8-22 (U. of 
Chi. Press 1976) (total wealth maximization); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An 
Interest-Group Perspective, 5 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 73 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost 
Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941, 948 n. 25 (2002) (“Despite the wish of economists and their 
fellow travelers that the goal of antitrust be to promote overall efficiency, neither case law nor legisla-
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own limited ability to come to terms with its commands.8  Perhaps as a 
result, “free market ideologues have waged war on [it] for the past thirty or 
so years.”9  It has gone through substantial evolution over time,10 to the 
point where it “means not what its framers may have thought, but what 
economists and economics-minded lawyers and judges think.”11  A mighty 
school was founded in the Midwest – Chicago – to try and add content to 
  
tive history stands for the proposition that overall economic welfare or wealth maximization trumps 
low prices.”); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213, 220 (1979) (“The primary objective of antitrust policy is to promote full and 
fair market competition and to reap the benefits that competition brings with it.”); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
23 J. Leg. Stud. 667 (1994) (total wealth maximization); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 
65, 68 (1982) (goal is the prevention of unfair wealth redistribution “from consumers to firms with 
market power”); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219 
(1988); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 168 
(2005) (“There is widespread agreement that the clearly articulated purpose of antitrust is to protect 
consumers.”); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979).  The 
current dominant view is that antitrust laws are designed to protect consumers. See Am. Academic 
Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317, 1319 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (“The modern 
conception of the Sherman Act is of a statute that seeks to protect consumers from monopolistic prac-
tices rather than competitors from competitive practices.”).  Monopsony may be a different story.  See 
Michael C. Naughton, Buyer Power Under Attack: Recent Trends in Monopsony Cases, 18 Antitrust 
81, 82-83 (2004); see also Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician Collective Bargaining: State 
Legislation and the State Action Doctrine, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1731 (2005) (monopsony generally). 
 8. See e.g. Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (“[J]udges often lack 
the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence 
a practice’s effect on competition.”); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 952-53 (recognizing limits of judiciary to 
balance technological benefits of arrangements against anticompetitive effects); Thomas E. Kauper, 
Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 Geo. L.J. 1623, 1624 (2005) (Judges 
and juries “cannot define monopolization but . . . know it when they see it.”). 
 9. David F. Shores, Economic Formalism in Antitrust Decisionmaking, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 1053, 1093 
(2005).  One might identify the initial shot fired in the war as Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, supra n. 7. 
 10. See e.g. Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in Post-Chicago Developments 
in Antitrust Law 60, 60-64 (Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, & Roger Van den Bergh, eds., 2002) 
(discussing antitrust’s classical and structural eras); Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and 
Practice 7 (Cambridge U. Press 2004) (describing pre-Chicago antitrust efforts as fueled “more by the 
desire to restrain large firms than by the objective of increasing economic efficiency”); see generally 
U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that the imposition of territorial restric-
tions on resellers is a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Stand. Oil Co. of Cal. v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293, 
314 (1949) (holding that a practice substantially lessens competition if it can be shown that “competi-
tion has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.”); U.S. v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (holding that a conspiracy to eliminate competition violates the Sherman Act 
regardless of the amount or importance of interstate commerce affected); Intl. Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 
392, 396 (1947) (holding that “foreclos[ing] competitors from any substantial market” is per se illegal); 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding that resale price 
maintenance is illegal); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1032-33 (differentiating between 
allocative efficiency and consumer welfare). 
 11. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 209 (1987). 
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its strictures.12  But then “some economists started kicking the tires on the 
Chicago results.”13 
What is it?  Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopoli-
zation, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize.14  It 
“has been a source of puzzlement to lawyers, judges and scholars. . . .”15  
Its standards are “not just vague but vacuous.”16  “Notwithstanding a cen-
tury of litigation, the scope and meaning of exclusionary conduct under the 
Sherman Act remain poorly defined.”17  Indeed, “[t]here is great variation 
in how the courts analyze unilateral practices.”18  Thus, although scholars19 
and courts20 have attempted to describe what Section 2 prohibits, about the 
  
 12. See e.g. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Symposium, Antitrust: Designing Antitrust Rules 
for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74, 77 (2005) 
(stating that in the 1950s, the Chicago School began arguing that many unilateral practices should be 
per se legal and that the Chicago School “revolutionalized antitrust”); Edmund W. Kitch e.d., The Fire 
of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J. L. & Econ. 163 (1983) 
(overview of Chicago School antitrust literature); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979); The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law vol. 1, 227-
33, 601-05 (Peter Newman ed., Stockton Press 1998) (origins of Chicago School). 
 13. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12 at 78-79.  True or not, Kodak has been criticized by the same group 
that supposedly obtained the imprimatur.  See e.g. Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and 
Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990).  Evans and Padilla believe that the post-Chicago group 
received a “limited Supreme Court imprimatur” in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 
504 U.S. 451 (1992), wherein the Court rejected a per se legal approach in favor of a rule of reason 
approach.  See e.g. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to 
Deal – Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J. 659, 678-81 (2001); Herbert Hovenk-
amp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 257, 318-23 (2001) 
(recognizing contributions of post-Chicago School of antitrust); Motta, supra n. 10. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 15. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1623; see also Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47, 
48-52 (1982) (whether barrier to entry is desirable depends on whether one believes that the property 
right to exclude creating the barrier is desirable). 
 16. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 255 (2003). 
 17. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147, 147-48, 164 n. 4 
(2005).  According to Hovenkamp, “[t]he first Supreme Court case that treated unilateral exclusionary 
conduct on the merits was Stand. Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).”   
 18. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 73. 
 19. See generally e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17. 
 20. Recently, the Supreme Court explained Section 2 thusly:  
 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. . . .  To 
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found 
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct. 
 
Verizon Commun., Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (original empha-
sis omitted).  The classic definition of a Section 2 claim occurred in U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 
563, 570-71 (1966).  On another occasion, the Court defined monopolizing conduct as “the use of 
monopoly power to ‘foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competi-
tor.’”  Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).  
Try squaring that definition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s observa-
tion in Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., that “injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous 
competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals’ wounds.” 864 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir. 
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best that can be said is that it prohibits a firm from “do[ing] something 
bad.”21  Though “we have made some progress toward a new standard, 
there is still a long way to go.”22 
The ambiguity of what Section 2 prohibits can have grave conse-
quences.  “Few roles of government are more important to the upgrading 
of an economy than ensuring vigorous domestic rivalry.”23  In today’s fast 
paced marketplace, “[i]t is desirable for [firms] to be able to know what the 
law is – what is permitted and what is not.”24  Uncertainty “dulls invest-
ment and deters welfare-increasing competition.”25  On the other hand, 
“[f]irms will get away with welfare-reducing practices if competition pol-
icy is too lenient. . . .”26  Also, to the extent that preventing administrative 
difficulties is a legitimate concern of antitrust analysis, Section 2’s ambi-
guity certainly does not further administrative ease.27  At least one com-
mentator has suggested that plaintiffs have won cases not on the merits, but 
“[a]t least in part because of the looseness of existing Section 2 stan-
dards.”28  And in a world where competition is global, uncertainty resulting 
  
1989); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).  On yet another 
occasion, the Supreme Court indicated that a firm does not engage in monopolizing conduct if the 
conduct is a function of “valid business reasons,” a “normal business purpose,” or “legitimate business 
reasons.”  See e.g. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597, 605, 608 
(1985).  What is “valid,” “normal,” or “legitimate?”  See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 265.  As Kauper has 
observed,  
 
[t]he court’s [in LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003)] lengthy analysis of the 
major Supreme Court decisions following the decision in Alcoa comes to the unremarkable 
conclusion that ‘a monopolist will be found to violate [Section Two] of the Sherman Act if 
it engages in exclusionary or predatory conduct without a valid business justification.’ 
 
Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1633.  The court in Microsoft gave a “fairly elaborate definition [of exclusionary 
conduct] that included allocation of proof burdens” that Hovenkamp has described as “fairly unfo-
cused.”  Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 152-53.  Recognizing the limits of the Supreme Court’s definition 
of conduct prohibited by Section 2, Elhauge has observed that “[c]ourts and commentators have offered 
other formulations to get around these problems with the Grinnell test.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 263.   
 21. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 950. 
 22. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1625, 1627.  Kauper has further observed that the Supreme Court has not 
“particularly distinguished itself in Section Two cases.”   
 23. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 662 (Free Press 1990). 
 24. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 967 (“One advantage of a bright-line 
rule is that it would let incumbents know where they stand.”).  In the context of one theory of Section 2 
liability, essential facilities, Elhauge has remarked that “the persistence of the essential facilities doc-
trine in the lower courts demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s more general monopolization standards 
have not provided sufficient guidance to make it clear that antitrust duties to deal do not apply to mo-
nopolists who develop ‘superior’ products.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 262. 
 25. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 74. 
 26. Id. at 80. 
 27. See e.g. AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that 
preventing administrative difficulties is a legitimate concern to antitrust analysis). 
 28. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1624. 
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in differences in the application of competition law can result in conduct 
being legal in one jurisdiction and illegal in another.29  
Scholars30 and the government31 have taken their shots at coming up 
with a test for identifying conduct prohibited by Section 2 – all of which 
have their problems.32  But then there’s the golden boy – predatory pricing.  
  
 29. See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 264-65 (“The utter vacuity of this sort of standard is neatly illus-
trated by the fact that the same conduct – using above-cost price cuts to drive out rivals – has been 
labeled ‘competition on the merits’ in the United States, but not ‘normal competition’ in Europe.”). 
 30. See e.g. ABA Sec. on Antitrust, 2002 Annual Rev. of Antitrust L. Devs. 249 (5th ed., ABA 2003) 
(conduct is “especially” likely to be predatory if it is “improper for reasons extrinsic to the antitrust 
laws.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194-95 (2d ed., U. of Chi. Press 2001) (conduct capable of 
excluding an equally efficient rival); Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 
113 (West 1977) (asserting that competitive behavior can be distinguished from anticompetitive behav-
ior because the latter involves “the predator . . . acting in a way which will not maximize present or 
foreseeable future profits unless it drives or keeps others out or forces them to tread softly. . . .  Such 
conduct makes sense if, but only if, it is seen as a means of driving out or controlling competitors.”); 
William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory 
Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1 (1979) (proposing that price used to capture monopoly is market price and 
should be frozen there to avoid predatory pricing); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 
91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 59 (2005) (“Examples of desirable predation rules include complete immunity 
against predation claims for firms with market shares below particular thresholds, per se legality for 
prices above the specified cost threshold, and well-defined safe harbors for mixed bundling schemes.”); 
Edlin, supra n. 7 (advocating for a price freeze when faced with new competition, and suggesting a 
“quality freeze” too); Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 256 (arguing that “the proper monopolization standard 
should focus on whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1) 
only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or 
not it enhances monopolist efficiency”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986) (only exclu-
sionary conduct that raises rivals’ costs and allows firm to charge supra-competitive prices should be 
prohibited); Ari Lehman, Eliminating the Below-Cost Pricing Requirement from Predatory Pricing 
Claims, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 343 (2005) (only possibility of recoupment should be considered in preda-
tory pricing cases); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: 
Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8 (1981) (sacrifice of profits test); Steven C. Salop & R. 
Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 617, 650-51 (1999) (proposing analysis of impacts of conduct on raising barriers to 
competition and efficiency effects); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust 
Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551 (1991) (contending that high concentration and 
barriers to entry are prerequisites to successful exclusionary conduct). Hovenkamp has opined that a 
“workable” definition of exclusionary conduct must satisfy two criteria: 1) it must define prohibited 
conduct with “tolerable accuracy, in particular, without excessive false positives” and 2) it must “be 
administrable by a court, perhaps in a jury trial.”  See Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 148. 
 31. See Br. for U.S. & FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petr. at 15-25, Verizon, 540 U.S. 398 (con-
duct that sacrifices profits and conduct the profitability of which depends on excluding rivals). 
 32. See e.g. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 945-49 (advocating predation test without requiring sacrifice of 
short-run profits); Elhauge, supra n. 16 (criticizing sacrifice test, efficiency-based tests, and balancing); 
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 
72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 56-57 (2004) (criticizing sacrifice theory of predation); see Hovenkamp, supra n. 
17, at 154, 157, 160 (excluding equally efficient rival “can underdeter in situations where the rival that 
is most likely to emerge is less efficient than the dominant firm”) (“‘Sacrifice’ of short-run revenues is 
a necessary, but hardly a sufficient, condition for condemning a unilateral refusal to deal under [sec-
tion] 2.”) (“In sum, raising rivals’ costs is a sometimes useful but also incomplete definition of exclu-
sionary practices.”).  Regarding Edlin’s price and quality freezes, one should consider very seriously 
the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that “the antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man 
regulatory agencies.”  Chi. Prof. Sports LP v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996).   
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“We may have a lot of uncertainty around the edges [of the predatory pric-
ing doctrine], including what precise measure of costs to use.  But we can 
spot the bald man and the above-cost pricer without difficulty in most 
cases. . . .”33  The test for measuring predatory pricing is certain,34 business 
knows where it stands,35 it fosters vigorous price competition rather than 
stifling it,36 and it avoids costly erroneous decisions.37  Indeed, many start 
with the predatory pricing standard and try to extrapolate from it a standard 
that could apply more generally under Section 2.38   
In this article, I take the opposite approach.  Rather than trying to “spot 
the bald man” through a rule-based economic analysis, as occurs in preda-
tory pricing cases, we should take a page from Justice Holmes, who wrote: 
“General propositions do not decide concrete cases.  The decision will de-
pend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major 
  
 33. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 268. 
 34. See e.g. id. at 268 (“[T]he one exception to the current vacuity of monopolization standards may 
be the most maligned area of monopolization law – predatory pricing doctrine.  You may love it or you 
may hate it, but at least you have some idea what the doctrine means.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 
148 (“About the best antitrust has been able to produce are rules designed for specific classes of cases, 
such as the cost rules governing predatory pricing. . . .”).  
 35. See e.g. Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1635 (“It is undoubtedly true that businesses would be comforted 
by a bright line, below cost standard. . . .”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court 
adopted the general rule that above-cost price cuts never violate the antitrust laws, it made the law of 
predatory pricing more predictable than it had previously been.”).  
 36. See e.g. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226-27 
(1993) (“It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low that 
antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.”); John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory 
Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? (U. of Chi. Press 1999) (often, what competi-
tors claim is predation is often just ordinary competition); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 73 (“[T]here 
is no reason to assume that aggressive unilateral pricing is bad – quite the opposite.”); Hovenkamp, 
supra n. 17, at 157 (“We do not condemn the monopolist who cuts price to an above cost level because 
it knew that a rival would be forced to exit from the market.  Such behavior is completely consistent 
with our conception of proper competition.”); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard 
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1080 (“It is appropriate that the 
courts and the government tread cautiously in limiting a firm’s freedom to cut prices.”); but see Mal-
colm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. Polit. Econ. 266 
(1986) (cost to a firm of acquiring competitors reduced through predation). 
 37. See e.g. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 
227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a 
particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.”); 
Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 83 (“There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  A practice once condemned is likely to stay condemned, no matter its benefits.  A 
monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually yield to competition, though, as the monopo-
list’s higher prices attract rivalry.”) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1, 15 (1984)); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657, 701-02 
(2001) (Competition will constrain false acquittal costs, “[a] dominant firm that consistently charges 
monopoly prices will attract entrants to its market.”); see also Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7, at 223 
(“[A]ny [predatory pricing] standard that encourages entry by forcing price to be kept above long-run 
marginal cost for a period of time necessarily runs the risk of preserving inefficient firms. . . .”). 
 38. See Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 269 (“The relative success with predatory pricing doctrine has led 
courts and commentators to try to generalize it into a global standard for determining what conduct 
meets the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization test.”). 
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premise.”39  If predatory pricing is as good as it gets, and it still fails to 
capture conduct with anticompetitive consequences, then we should aban-
don all strict rules-based approaches to Section 2 cases in favor of a fact-
based Rule of Reason analysis.40  After all, as Justice Holmes recognized, 
“a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”41   
In Part II of the article, I generally describe predatory pricing law – 
where we’ve been and where we are.  In Part III of the article, I try to take 
some of the luster off of the golden boy and point out deficiencies in the 
current predatory pricing standard.  In Part IV of the article, I advocate for 
adopting the Rule of Reason as the standard in Section 2 cases. 
II. PREDATORY PRICING – FROM HAIRY HIPPY TO BALD MAN 
It has been argued that the antitrust laws’ legislative history supports 
the notion that the laws were meant to prohibit anticompetitive price cuts – 
regardless of whether they are below cost.42  Thus, predatory pricing 
claims used to turn simply on whether the allegedly predatory price was 
intended to harm rivals.43  In fact, liability for predatory price discrimina-
  
 39. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 40. The classic articulation of the Rule of Reason occurred in Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. U.S., 
246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (setting forth:  
 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and per-
haps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business . . . ; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint and its effect, actual or probable. 
 
); see also State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 22 (1997); Natl. Socy. of Prof. Engrs. v. U.S., 435 
U.S. 679 (1978); Stand. Oil, 221 U.S. 1; William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook 466 (1995 ed., 
Clark Boardman Callaghan 1995); James A. Keyte, What It Is and How It Is Being Applied: The 
“Quick Look” Rule of Reason, 11 Antitrust 21 (1997) (explaining the quick look rule and analyzing its 
applications); Sullivan, supra n. 30, at 187-88. 
 41. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 42. See e.g. Shores, supra n. 9; see also H.R. Rpt. 74-2287, at 7-8 (1936) (reprinted in The Legisla-
tive History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 4, 3187 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 
Chelsea H. Publishers 1980)); Sen. Rpt. 74-1502 at 4 (Feb. 3, 1936) (reprinted in The Legislative His-
tory of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 4, 3014-15 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea 
H. Publishers 1980)); Sen. Rpt. 63-698 at 1 (1914) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal 
Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes vol. 2, 1744 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea H. Publishers 1978)); 
H.R. Rpt. 63-627 at 8-9 (July 22, 1914) (reprinted in The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust 
Laws and Related Statutes vol. 2, 1090-91 (Earl W. Kintner ed., Chelsea H. Publishers 1978)). 
 43. See e.g. Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 
335 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1964); Md. Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller 
& Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944).  Elhauge has offered that this standard “helped not a 
whit in sorting out bad pricing from good.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 269. 
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tion was found without requiring probable or actual monopolization.44  Yet 
some cases brought early under Section 2 suggest that below cost pricing 
was indicative of, if not proof of, the type of conduct Section 2 prohibits.45  
The results under this old scheme were mixed.46 
Then came Areeda and Turner’s “watershed article”47 – Predatory 
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.48  They 
proposed using cost analysis to evaluate pricing behavior to identify and 
distinguish predatory pricing from competitive pricing.49  Criticism of 
Areeda and Turner’s theory came early, and primarily focused on the diffi-
culty in measuring cost.50  More recent scholarship also points to the diffi-
culty of measuring cost, but goes further by arguing that a strict, cost-based 
analysis does not adequately capture prices that may be predatory even 
though above cost.51 
Then came the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.52  In it, the Supreme Court directed federal 
courts to play a gatekeeping role to ensure that only economically sound 
  
 44. See e.g. Utah Pie Co. v. Contl. Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).  Edlin has called such cases 
“particularly galling.”  Edlin, supra n. 7, at 953. 
 45. See e.g. U.S. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160 (1911) (observing that American Tobacco 
was engaging in “ruinous competition, by lowering the price of plug below its cost”). 
 46. See e.g. Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. 
L.J. 2239, 2250 (2000) (asserting that before 1975, “[p]laintiffs won most litigated cases, including 
those they probably should have lost”). 
 47. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087. 
 48. 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See e.g. Sullivan, supra n. 30, at 110-11.  Areeda and Turner even went back and forth with one 
of their immediate critics, F.M. Scherer, exchanging volleys on the cost-based approach.  Compare 
F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 868 (1976) 
(specifically his section entitled Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, at 883-85), with 
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891 
(1976), with F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976).  
Oliver Williamson agreed with Areeda and Turner that marginal cost pricing had certain benefits to 
which Areeda and Turner referred, but was concerned that their proposed legal rule would immunize 
short-term price cuts that would lead to supra-competitive prices later.  See Oliver E. Williamson, 
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284, 290 (1977). 
 51. See e.g. Robert Pitofsky et al., Trade Regulation 868-69 (5th ed., West 2003); Richard A. Pos-
ner, supra n. 30, at 217-20 (suggesting that Areeda and Turner’s test is too generous to defendants); 
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 Antitrust L.J. 
585, 591 (1994) (price cuts that don’t fall below cost may still injure competition); Patrick Bolton et al., 
Predatory Pricing: Response to Critique and Further Elaboration, 89 Geo. L.J. 2495, 2499 (2001) 
(advocating the use of factual evidence in addition to economic theory); Bolton et al., supra n. 46, at 
2242-62 (discussing criticism of Areeda and Turner and suggesting alternatives); Edlin, supra n. 7, at 
942 (“above-cost pricing can . . . hurt consumers by limiting competition”); see also Crane, supra n. 30, 
at 3 (recognizing that “some commentators and courts have wondered whether the Supreme Court has 
become too solicitous of price competition and too skeptical about claims of predation”). 
 52. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).   
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cases go to a jury.53  Courts applying Matsushita have interpreted it as cre-
ating “a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory pricing 
is unlikely to threaten competition.”54 
With Matsushita as a backdrop, and despite the criticism of Areeda 
and Turner’s cost-based approach, the Supreme Court formally adopted a 
cost-based approach to evaluating predatory pricing claims in Brooke 
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.55  Specifically, the Court ex-
plained that a successful predatory pricing claim requires proof that 1) the 
price is below an appropriate measure of cost, and 2) “the competitor had a 
reasonable prospect, or, under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous 
probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”56  In lay-
men’s terms, “[i]f you price below your incremental costs and have enough 
market power to make it reasonably likely than you can recoup your losses 
by raising prices after you have disciplined or driven out your rival, then 
you have engaged in predatory pricing.  If you price above cost, you are 
home free.”57   
Brooke Group has been viewed as a dramatic break with precedent.58  
Whereas Brooke Group creates a safe harbor59 for price cuts so long as 
they are above some measure of cost, the Supreme Court’s previous cases 
on predation had required only a showing of an intent to harm competi-
tion.60  Nonetheless, Brooke Group – concededly revolutionary – had roots 
  
 53. See id. at 587-88; see also Crane, supra n. 30, at 47 (“Matsushita invites district courts in the 
first instance, and courts of appeal in the second, to scrutinize the economic logic of predatory pricing 
cases and only permit theoretically sound cases to proceed to the jury.”).  Crane sees in Matsushita a 
“counterweight to anticorporate jury tendencies in the form of heightened judicial scrutiny of plaintiffs’ 
predatory pricing claims.”  Id.; see also James L. Warren & Mary B. Cranston, Summary Judgment 
After Matsushita, Antitrust 12-13 (Summer 1987) (describing Matsushita’s stringent gatekeeping 
standards). 
 54. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newsps., Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted); see 
also Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating 
that the Court in Matsushita decided “that the economic disincentives to predatory pricing often will 
justify a presumption that an allegation of such behavior is implausible”).  As Wesley J. Liebeler has 
noted, “almost all of the predatory pricing cases that have come before the courts since 1975 could 
have been decided summarily for the defendant under the standards set forth in Matsushita.”  Wesley J. 
Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1052, 1054 (1986). 
 55. 509 U.S. at 222-24. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 268; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 950-55 (laying out current state of 
predation law). 
 58. See e.g. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1086. 
 59. See Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1628 (“Brooke Group comes close to establishing a safe harbor for 
predatory pricing cases, a safe harbor based on a combination of below-cost sales and the use of market 
share or capacity data to establish the reasonable likelihood of recoupment or its absence.”); Lehman, 
supra n. 30, at 372. 
 60. See e.g. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221 (discussing previous predation jurisprudence).  In fact, 
shortly before Brooke Group, the Court specifically declined to decide whether a party could show 
predatory pricing when the pricing in question is above some measure of cost.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
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in previous cases.61  Notwithstanding the evolution of predatory pricing 
towards a comparably clear rule based approach, it “is currently generating 
considerable debate in academic literature.”62  The debate extends to what 
constitutes predatory pricing63 – commentators still are not sure what it is.64  
Further, predatory pricing has variations across the globe.65 
III.  DULLING THE GOLDEN BOY 
Predatory pricing law has lost its focus.  Rather than focusing on the 
forest – the competitive consequences of conduct – courts are preoccupied 
with a single tree – whether the Brooke Group test has been met regardless 
of actual competitive consequences.  This is a function of a preoccupation 
with economic theory rather than cold, hard facts.  It is also a function of a 
preoccupation with classifying conduct rather than evaluating the results of 
conduct as demonstrated by facts.  These general propositions manifest 
themselves in the problems specific to Brooke Group – it does not result in 
certainty, foster price competition, or benefit consumers. 
  
585 n. 9; Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 702.  Elhauge has suggested that it did not even do so in Brooke Group 
to the extent that its statement that the Court has “rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . . 
inflict injury to competition cognizable under the antitrust laws” is dicta.  See Einer Elhauge, Why 
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – and the Implications for Defining 
Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681, 697 (2003) (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223). 
 61. See e.g. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 
1989); Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d 227.  Barry Wright has been described as an “influential pre-
Brooke Group case in which the court held that predatory pricing suits could not be brought when 
prices exceed all measures of cost.”  Edlin, supra n. 7, at 987.  
 62. Lehman, supra n. 30, at 343; see generally Bolton et al., supra n. 46; David Close, “Don’t Fear 
the Reaper”: Why Transferable Assets and Avoidable Costs Should Not Resurrect Predatory Pricing, 
88 Iowa L. Rev. 433 (2002); Edlin, supra n. 7; Elhauge, supra n. 60; Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a 
Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 Antitrust 52 
(2003). 
 63. Compare Baumol, supra n. 30, at 2-3 (above cost pricing can be predatory); Edlin, supra n. 7, at 
945-46 (same); Williamson, supra n. 50, at 290-92 (same), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 269-304; 333-37 (1981) (above cost pricing 
can not be predatory); Elhauge, supra note 30 (above cost pricing can not be predatory). 
 64. Compare Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 27 (2005) (equating bundling with predatory pricing), with Richard A. Posner, Vertical 
Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 229 (2005) (multi-product ties create unique anti-
trust concerns); Ordover & Willig, supra n. 30, at 55 (collecting critiques). 
 65. See e.g. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 264 (European Commission approach to predatory pricing); 
Norman W. Hawker, Predatory Pricing Law in the United States and Canada, 7 U. Miami Bus. L. 
Rev. 201 (1999) (Canadian approach to predatory pricing law); Ross Jones, An International Perspec-
tive on Anti-Competitive Pricing Practices by Dominant Carriers & Regulatory Rules to Facilitate 
Competitive Entry – Australia, 14 DePaul Bus. L.J. 243, 249-50 (2002) (Australian approach to preda-
tory pricing law). 
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A. The First Swipe – Economic Theory 
Rules based on economic theory are great – if you price below cost, 
you may be pricing predatorily, if you don’t, you’re not – but such rules 
have the same limitations as all rules.  “[T]he trick is to carry general prin-
ciple as far as it can go in substantial furtherance of the precise statutory or 
constitutional prescription.”66  Wedding predatory pricing analysis to a 
cost-based standard is not necessarily commensurate with the legislative 
history of the antitrust laws.67  Further, economic theory does not bear any 
relationship to reality in all cases.68  For example, though the Supreme 
Court in Brooke Group declared that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful,”69 predatory pricing claims continue 
to be filed70 and recent scholarship suggests that predation occurs far more 
often than previously believed.71  When economic theory does bear a rela-
  
 66. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989); see 
also Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 57 
(2003) (survey of legal formalism). 
 67. See generally supra n. 42; Shores, supra n. 9, at 1091 (“In short, Brooke Group stands for the 
proposition that economic theory trumps legislative history. . . .”). 
 68. See e.g. R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 3-4 (U. Chi. Press 1988).  
 
The rational utility maximizer of economic theory bears no resemblance to the man on the 
Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman) on any bus.  There is no reason to suppose 
that most human beings are engaged in maximizing anything unless it be unhappiness, and 
even this with incomplete success.   
 
Id. 
 69. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted); see also Bork, supra n. 7, at 144 (arguing that 
“[u]nsophisticated theories of predation . . . [have led] to drastic overestimation of its likelihood”); 
Easterbrook, supra n. 63, at 264 (“[T]here is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the courts to take 
predation seriously.”). 
 70. See e.g. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 (recognizing that there is ample evidence that predatory pricing 
occurs); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); Multistate Leg. Stud., 
Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof. Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722 (W.D. Tx. 2003) (jury 
verdict at trial, settled while on appeal); Crane, supra n. 30, at n. 18 (listing predatory pricing cases).  
Some, all, or none of such cases may have been filed for strategic reason.  See Edward A. Snyder & 
Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551 
(1991) (study showing that competitor plaintiffs systematically misuse the antitrust laws).  But there is 
no way to be certain.  See Crane, supra n. 30, at 36 (data is consistent with firms using predatory pric-
ing cases strategically, “but direct proof is limited.”).  Given the cost of the strategy, it may be unlikely.  
See Easterbrook, supra n. 63, at 334-35 (estimating mean litigation cost in predatory pricing case at $3 
million, and explaining that AT&T spent $100 million to defend against predation charges); Steven C. 
Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1015 
(1986) ($75,000 to $194,000 in 1984 dollars).   
 71. See e.g. Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at 869; Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 
361-80 (MIT 1988) (limit pricing and predation can preclude entry); Bolton et al., supra n. 46, at 2250-
51 (pricing below cost can send “strategic communication involving threats and sanctions”); Evans & 
Padilla, supra n. 12, at 78 (“A further strand of modern economics undercuts the proposition that firms 
had no incentive or ability to engage in predatory pricing.”); Yun Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of 
Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store 
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tionship to reality, it can be in conflict with itself.72  Economic theory has 
also limited the reach of antitrust to such an extent that important areas of 
the law have remained unchanged, unchallenged, and (arguably) underen-
forced for more than thirty years.73   
In the antitrust context, “general principles based on economic theory 
that tell us nothing about the actual economic effect of a particular restraint 
in a particular case should be . . . cast aside.”74  This principle – that facts 
demonstrating economic effect trump theory – has been recognized by 
courts in predatory pricing cases.75  Far more frequently, plaintiffs lose if 
  
Game, 25 RAND J. Econ. 72, 73 (1994) (experiment supports theory that firms engage in predation to 
support reputation of strength); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of 
Predatory Pricing, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 162, 163 (1993) (an incumbent may be able to 
use predation to build a reputation for toughness and thus discourage potential new entrants); David M. 
Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. Econ. Theory 253 (1982) (analyz-
ing effect on reputation of predatory pricing); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry 
Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 Econometrica 443 (1982); Paul Milgrom 
& John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Econ. Theory 280 (1982) (preda-
tion may be rational against new entrants because it yields a reputation that deters entrants); Ordover & 
Willig, supra n. 30, at 77-79 (in more complex, realistic markets, aggressive pricing can yield long-run 
benefits). 
 72. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text In This Class?” The Conflict 
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 38, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=556380 (last 
updated Apr. 23, 2006).  
 
So, Brown & Williamson, an experienced and successful company with many decades of in-
timate knowledge of this industry, apparently believed that it could better its profits by forc-
ing Liggett back into line through a price war, but Justice Kennedy and his colleagues, 
armed with the best economic theory Chicago has to offer, know better – Brown & Wil-
liamson was just wasting its shareholders’ money.  How arrogant.  How implausible.  Note 
that in accepting a highly contestable and specific economic theory, the Court ignores a 
much more general and basic piece of wisdom from economics: we should generally pre-
sume that experienced actors within an industry are rationally pursuing their goals. 
 
Id. 
 73. Eleanor M. Fox et al., U.S. Antitrust in Global Context 300, 302 (2d ed., West 2004) (“General 
Dynamics is still the latest horizontal merger case decided on its merits by the Supreme Court, and it 
remains good law. . . .  Marine Bancorporation is the Supreme Court’s last word on mergers that elimi-
nate potential competition.”).  Both cases are more than thirty years old.  U.S. v. Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); U.S. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 74. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054. 
 75. See e.g. Contl. T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 946 
(stating that in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff can prove predatory 
pricing based on factors other than the relation between an alleged predator’s price and cost); Concord 
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a plaintiff can prove predatory pricing based on factors other than the 
relation between an alleged predator’s price and cost); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Contl. 
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
a plaintiff can prove predatory pricing based on factors other than the relation between an alleged 
predator’s price and cost).  According to Shores, the Supreme Court’s precedent before Brooke Group 
had been generally understood as holding that while below-cost pricing was powerful evidence of 
predatory intent, it was not critical to the plaintiff’s case.”  Shores, supra n. 9, at 1085-86. 
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they cannot show below cost pricing.76  This is so notwithstanding the fact 
that economics does not necessarily help decision-makers reach the right 
conclusions.77  Indeed, it may confuse the issues to the point where it hurts 
more than helps.78 
B. The Second Swipe – Missing the Forest for the Trees 
There seems to be a preoccupation with classifying specific types of 
conduct and trying to define standards based on conduct’s classification, 
rather than focusing on standards for evaluating the results of conduct re-
gardless of how the conduct is classified.79  Such a preoccupation can re-
sult in overly formalistic application of rules that may excuse conduct that 
  
 76. The Sixth Circuit in Spirit Airlines had to reverse the district court’s award of summary judg-
ment to Northwest Airlines since the district court had found that “the record compels the conclusion 
that Northwest’s prices were not predatory, because the airline operated profitably” on the relevant 
routes.  See Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 227; MCI Commun. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1983) (pricing above long run incremental costs not predatory); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. N.W. Airlines, 
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 at *77 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also Debra J. Pearlstein et al. eds., 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 474, 476 (5th ed. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s observation in Brooke Group that predatory pricing claims are ‘rarely successful’ has proved to 
be prescient.  In the years since that decision, primary line injury claims frequently have been defeated 
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (predatory pricing 
“law requires that prices be below cost.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1080 (in predatory pricing cases, “the 
government never wins.  And, of course, private plaintiffs have fared no better.”).   
 77. See Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“We are less confident in the ability of economics to 
help juries, courts, and regulators to reason their way to the right answers.”).  Elhauge has noted that 
“scholars have so far also been unable to devise administrable standards for sorting out desirable from 
undesirable conduct that tends to exclude rivals.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 267; see Elhauge, supra n. 
16, at n. 43 (Prominent antitrust economists William Baumol, Janus Ordover, Frederick Warren-
Boulton, and Robert Willig, acknowledge that courts and legal and economic scholars have “not yet 
been able to solve the ‘vexing problem’ of developing ‘workable standards’ for determining when 
conduct. . . . [is] exclusionary, so that there is not yet any ‘universal economic litmus test’ for judging 
this question.”). 
 78. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1995) (juror interviews in antitrust trials, including Brooke Group, revealed 
that “the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their compre-
hension. . . .  At no time did any juror grasp – even at the margins – the law, the economics, or any 
other testimony relating to the allegations or defense.”); Crane, supra n. 30, at 46 (“It would surely be 
surprising to find that jurors actually understand the substance of predatory pricing law, when the very 
definition of predation and its elements have long been, and continue to be, debated by the brightest 
minds in both economics and law.”); Edlin, supra n. 7, at 956 (“My view is that one reason that two 
decades of information-theoretical results in economics have not had as much influence on the courts as 
they should is that they are relatively complex.”). 
 79. See e.g. Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 342 (lamenting the use of “a barrage of conclusory labels like 
‘exclusionary,’ ‘predatory,’ ‘valid,’ ‘legitimate,’ and ‘competition on the merits’ to cover for a lack of 
any well-defined criteria for sorting out desirable from undesirable conduct that tends to exclude ri-
vals”); Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1626 (“Much of the effort in the past has been directed toward tailoring 
standards more precisely to particular conduct.  The leveraging doctrine, the concept of essential facili-
ties, and the relatively specific rule governing predatory pricing are products of this effort.”); but see 
Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1640 (“The Court has moved away from standards tailored to particular con-
duct.”). 
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has anticompetitive consequences.80  Further, classification “is not always 
very helpful in evaluating novel practices.”81  Whole volumes are written 
trying to classify conduct that may violate the antitrust laws.82  Despite the 
efforts at classification, clarity remains elusive.83   
  
 80. See e.g. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343 (“[T]he result of the process in any given case may provide 
little certainty or guidance about the legality of a practice in another context.”); City of Anaheim v. S. 
Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t would not be proper to focus on specific 
individual acts of an accused monopolist while refusing to consider their overall combined effect. . . .  
We are dealing with what has been called the ‘synergistic effect’ of the mixture of the elements.”).  The 
Supreme Court has recognized as much in the area of vertical non-price restraints.  Compare Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (drawing a distinction between sale and consignment of goods as they 
relate to legality of vertical non-price restraints), with Contl. T.V., 433 U.S. 36 (overruling Schwinn and 
recognizing distinction between sale and consignment as false for purposes of antitrust law).  In U.S. v. 
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), American Airlines won summary judgment on a predatory 
pricing claim because the trial court found that it was pricing above variable costs despite evidence that 
it drove competitors from the market and, thereafter, raised prices – in Lehman’s words, “exactly the 
harm economists worry about with anticompetitive behavior.”  Lehman, supra n. 30, at 355; see also 
Edlin, supra n. 7, at 943 (criticizing AMR decision). Shores thus concludes that “[t]he distinction be-
tween sales and consignments was formalistic because it failed to address the core issue in every anti-
trust case: Does the challenged restraint adversely affect competition in the market?”  Shores, supra n. 
9, at 1054.  Hovenkamp, praising theories based on raising rivals’ costs, explained that the benefits of 
such theories are that they “show that certain practices that have been the subject of antitrust scrutiny 
for a long time can be anticompetitive even though they do not literally ‘exclude.’”  Hovenkamp, supra 
n. 17, at 159.  In other words, just because conduct cannot be shoehorned into a definition of “exclu-
sionary” conduct does not mean that it is not anticompetitive.  And what is more important under the 
antitrust laws, whether conduct can fit into an arbitrary definition or its results – competitive or anti-
competitive?  Edlin has opined that “a single rule – the Brooke Group rule – does not fit all cases well.”  
Edlin, supra n. 7, at 960-61 (examples).  Elhauge has recognized the “sad state in which current mo-
nopolization doctrine finds itself, employing conclusory labels that offer little insight into which forms 
of conduct should and should not be deemed undesirable or illegal.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 255. 
 81. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 150.  One example may be the conduct at issue in Conwood Co., 
290 F.3d 768 (tobacco manufacturer discarded competitor’s point of sale displays and put competitor’s 
product in disadvantage positions in own displays).  It is a much maligned decision.  See e.g. Hovenk-
amp, supra n. 17, at n. 20; Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application vol. 3A, ¶ 782, 206 (Aspen Supp. 2004) [hereinafter Areeda 
& Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3A] (“In Conwood the Sixth Circuit brushed aside most of the ac-
cepted principles developed in the case law and the main text for distinguishing antitrust violations 
from tortious and even competitive practices.”). Although criticism may not be unwarranted, one 
should consider that “accepted principles” should be applied given the nuances in particular markets, 
which is what the court did in Conwood.  For example, there was evidence in the record – indeed, the 
parties agreed – regarding the importance of point of sale advertising to the tobacco industry.  See e.g. 
Conwood, 290 F.3d at 774.  Thus, although destroying point of sale displays in other industries may not 
be a big deal, in tobacco it may very well be.  Given that, a systemic plan to destroy point of sale dis-
plays in the tobacco industry (coupled with the other conduct described in Conwood) may be worthy of 
a jury question on monopolization. 
 82. See e.g. Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3, supra n. 81 (referencing, for example: ch. 
7A “Horizontal Acquisitions and Agreements”; ch. 7B “Exclusionary Practices: Patents”; and ch. 7C 
“Exploitative, Predatory, and Strategic Pricing”); id. (referencing, for example: ch. 7D “Exclusionary 
Practices by Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms”; ch. 7E “Unfair, Predatory, and Tortious Competi-
tion Unrelated to Pricing Policies”, ch. 7F “Exclusionary Practices by the Regulated Monopolist”; and 
ch. 8 “Power and the Power-Conduct Relationship in Monopolization and Attempt”). 
 83. Hovenkamp has argued, for example, that Areeda and Turner have given different definitions of 
exclusionary conduct over the evolution of their treatise on antitrust.  See Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 
149. 
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In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., for example, the 
Supreme Court conceded that “contrary inferences might reasonably be 
drawn” about whether the conduct at issue could “fairly be characterized as 
exclusionary. . . .”84  Thus, if it “is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust 
competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects,”85 courts 
and regulators should focus their attention not on whether certain conduct 
meets some definition,86 but on the conduct’s competitive effects.87 
C. The Brooke Group Fallacy  
Over reliance on economics and a preoccupation with classification 
manifests itself in the problems with Brooke Group – problems that con-
tradict and, in many respects, swallow its benefits.  Since the Court in 
Brooke Group left open the question of the relevant measure of costs,88 it 
provides no certainty on what may constitute predatory pricing.89  Some 
courts adopted average variable cost as the relevant measure, others aver-
age total cost.90  Areeda and Turner themselves recognized the challenges 
  
 84. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 604. 
 85. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993). 
 86. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 784 (“‘[A]nticompetitive’ conduct can come in too many different forms, 
and is too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have enumerated all the varie-
ties.”). 
 87. Pitofsky has criticized the notion that above-cost price cuts cannot produce competitive harm as 
“simplistic and overly generous to predators and would-be monopolists.”  Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at 
868. 
 88. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 n. 1. 
 89. See e.g. Rebel Oil Co. v. A. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
“[n]either the Supreme Court nor this circuit has concluded what would be the appropriate measure of 
cost in a predatory pricing case.”); Crane, supra n. 30, at 43 (stating:  
 
Predatory pricing litigation is an unpredictable enterprise.  The legal standards governing 
predation claims require examination of complex economic facts, such as whether costs ex-
ceeded revenues and whether defendant would have been able to recoup the costs of below-
cost pricing.  Even tests meant to provide clear guidance on permissible and impermissible 
pricing behavior leave open significant space for adjudicatory ambiguity. 
 
); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087 (“Thus, while the court was clear in adopting a cost-based standard, it 
failed to define that standard.”).  
 90. See Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 
Antitrust L.J. 541, 548-49 (1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competi-
tion and Its Practice § 8.5a (3d ed., West 2005) (representative cases); Penelope A. Preovolos, Unfair 
Practices and Predatory Pricing, 1408 PLI/Corp 687 passim (2004) (listing the First Circuit as “incre-
mental or variable”; the Second Circuit as “average variable cost/presumptions”; the Fifth Circuit as 
average variable or marginal costs; the Sixth Circuit as a hybrid; the Seventh Circuit as a “pure re-
coupment”; the Eighth Circuit as “average variable cost/presumptions”; the Ninth Circuit as average 
variable cost/presumptions; the Tenth Circuit as using marginal or average variable costs as a “valuable 
indicator”; the Eleventh Circuit as average total cost; and the D.C. Circuit, Third Circuit and Fourth 
Circuit as declining to adopt any measure of cost).  Just recently, the Tenth Circuit observed that 
“[d]espite a great deal of debate on the subject, no consensus has emerged as to what the most ‘appro-
priate’ measure of cost is in predatory pricing cases.”  AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115.  Relatedly, it is 
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to relying on marginal cost.91  Thus, the “only certainty after Brooke Group 
is that for the plaintiff to prevail on a predatory pricing claim, it must prove 
that the defendant priced below whatever cost standard the court deciding 
the case has adopted.”92  Importantly, there is no reason to believe that the 
Supreme Court will step in and clear up this uncertainty.93  As a result, the 
issues of what is the appropriate measure of costs, and how to measure 
such costs, are frequently issues of fact that seriously undermine any claim 
to certainty.94 
Uncertainty regarding the appropriate measure of cost by which preda-
tory pricing claims are evaluated is compounded by the fact that business 
schools teach little, if any, antitrust principles.95  Thus, there is little reason 
to believe that managers consider principles of predatory pricing law when 
making business decisions.96  Further, the whole notion of linking price to 
some measure of cost, and punishing those that price below the ordained 
measure of costs, has been described as “chimerical” in real markets be-
cause “pricing at marginal cost will not produce revenues equal to total 
production costs.”97 
The uncertainty surrounding the appropriate measure of costs may de-
ter price competition.98  To the extent that Brooke Group’s cost standard is 
  
uncertain whether the “meeting competition” defense is operable in a predatory pricing case.  See U.S. 
v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1204-08 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 91. Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3, supra n. 82, at ¶ 740, at 423. 
 92. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1087. 
 93. See Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1628 (Brooke Group’s failure to define appropriate measure of cost 
“reflects a conscious effort to avoid a difficult issue that divided lower courts.”); see also Cargill, 479 
U.S. at 117-18; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85 n. 8. 
 94. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 651 F.2d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant priced below average variable cost where plaintiff failed 
to present expert testimony on the issue); Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d 917; McGahee v. N. Propane Gas 
Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504 n. 38 (11th Cir. 1988) (“When average variable cost is appropriate to use, as 
well as determining what costs are variable, is an issue of fact requiring expert testimony.”). 
 95. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 49; Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics and Antitrust in MBA Pro-
grams: What’s Thought, What’s Taught, 47 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 87, 92 (2003) (describing the antitrust-
related curricula of certain business schools). 
 96. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 50-54 (discussing survey results of in-house lawyers regarding preda-
tory pricing law’s impact on business decisions). 
 97. Baumol, supra n. 30, at 21. 
 98. See Crane, supra n. 30, at 27 (discussing airline and tobacco industries and concluding that “it is 
quite possible that predatory pricing law facilitated the high prices that it is meant to deter”); Lehman, 
supra n. 30, at 372 (stating: 
 
In light of the uncertainty surrounding the measure of cost used for antitrust purposes, the 
best way for a firm to avoid antitrust trouble is to avoid price competition that comes any-
where close to cost levels.  By creating a safe harbor for prices above a certain measure of 
cost, the Court is encouraging competitors to avoid vigorous price competition, the opposite 
of what it intended. 
 
); see generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 243-44 (5th ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 
1998) (“[A] savage penalty will induce people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of 
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certain, it serves as an excuse for courts to set firms’ prices – if a firm is 
pricing predatorily under Brooke Group, all the court has to do is order that 
the firm set its prices above cost.99  The assertion that courts must err on 
the side of the market because decisions are so hard to overturn is not 
compelling,100 and concerns that a rule other than Brooke Group would 
chill price competition have been posited but not proven.101  Additionally, 
Brooke Group imposes an undue and unnecessary burden on defendants 
because plaintiffs need not prove recoupment – “[p]redators can face treble 
damages suits for pricing too low, even if they never offend the law’s ulti-
mate concern by pricing too high.”102  And despite many years of favorable 
law, “defendants continue to pay out substantial sums to settle predatory 
pricing lawsuits,” thus undermining Brooke Group’s efficacy at deterring 
unwarranted predatory pricing claims.103  
Lastly, Brooke Group’s rules excuse conduct that may have anticom-
petitive consequences.  For example, a firm may lower its prices in re-
sponse to a new entrant and drive the entrant from the market.  Thereafter, 
the firm may raise its prices without having to face competition from the 
vanquished new entrant.  Consumers are thus denied the benefit of compe-
tition on the merits.104  Further, such a result may deter entrants in the first 
place.105  The bottom-line is that above-cost predatory pricing may occur, it 
may harm competition, and it should not be excused simply because it does 
not meet the Brooke Group test so long as it results in anticompetitive con-
sequences.106 
  
the criminal activity.”); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984) (uncertainty leads to overcompliance). 
 99. See e.g. Am. Bldg. Prods., L.L.C. v. Ashley Aluminum, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15612 (E.D. 
La. 1997) (ordering defendant to return its prices to pre-predation levels pending final adjudication of 
case); Advantage Publications, Inc. v. Daily Press, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16912 (E.D. Va. 1983) 
(ordering defendant to hold its advertising rates at specified levels pending final adjudication of case); 
Crane, supra n. 30, at 44 (“[D]etermining which costs are fixed or variable in a particular case requires 
complex expert testimony.”). 
 100. GTE Sylvania overruled Schwinn.  Some cases addressed the nearly century-old per se rule 
against vertical price fixing.  St. Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 101. See e.g. Crane, supra n. 30, at 4 (“[T]he ‘chilling price competition’ claim was posited but never 
established.”). 
 102. According to Crane, this is a function of the fact that attempted predation is captured by the 
Sherman Act.  Id. at 3. 
 103. Id. at 16, 29. 
 104. See e.g. Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d 917; see generally AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109; supra n. 80 and 
accompanying text; see also Edlin, supra n. 7, at 944, 966. 
 105. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 945. 
 106. See e.g. Pitofsky et al., supra n. 51, at 868; Crane, supra n. 30, at 9 (“If the prey is less efficient 
than the predator, the predator may be able to exclude the prey from the market by pricing above its 
own cost but below the prey’s.”); Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 338 (“In short, the absence of evidence that 
monopoly prices, profits, or shares eventually rose in the long run does not mean the exclusionary 
conduct was not anticompetitive.”); Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (“Even above-cost predatory 
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IV. THE RULE SHOULD BE REASON IN SECTION 2 CASES 
“[A]bstract principles never provide an infallible guide to economic ef-
fect.”107  As described above, this has proved true in the most prominent 
area of antitrust law that has relied heavily on abstract principles to guide 
economic effect – predatory pricing.108  To the extent that rules fail in the 
predatory pricing context, they should be abandoned not only in that con-
text, but in all Section 2 cases that involve much more amorphous stan-
dards and conduct.109   
  
pricing strategies are unprofitable in the short run, and a rational firm will make such an investment 
only if it anticipates that it will be profitable in the long run.”).  The Supreme Court has said that 
“above-cost predatory pricing schemes [are] beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to con-
trol.”  Verizon, 540 U.S. at 414; see also Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7, at 255 (“[N]o practical way 
exists to distinguish a predatory price cut to a point above average total cost from one that is a short-run 
profit-maximizing response to the growth of competition.”).  Implicit in this observation is that above-
cost predatory pricing occurs, but is beyond the ability of courts to distinguish from beneficial price 
competition.  As suggested infra, a Rule of Reason approach addresses the Court’s concern by focusing 
on facts rather than bright-line rules that may or may not prove administrable.  Others have asserted 
that above-cost pricing should not fall under the Sherman Act.  See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 
(“We have rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . . inflict injury to competition cognizable 
under the antitrust laws.”); Posner, supra n. 30, at 215 (arguing that above-cost pricing should not be 
unlawful because it cannot exclude an equally efficient competitor); Easterbrook, supra n. 53; Edlin, 
supra n. 7, at n. 6 (“The proposition [that above-cost pricing can harm competition] is quite radical in 
that even economists who believe that predatory pricing is relatively common have generally been 
content to follow the courts in thinking that the key element of predation is short-run sacrifice by the 
predator. . . .”); Elhauge, supra n. 60; Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 156 (“If there is no sacrifice of 
immediate profits – that is, if the price cut is profitable immediately – then the price is efficient and 
absolutely lawful.”); Ordover & Willig, supra n. 30, at 54; Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“For example, 
when the Supreme Court adopted the general rule that above-cost price cuts never violate the antitrust 
laws, it made the law of predatory pricing more predictable than it had previously been.  In doing so, 
the Court clarified that a reduction in price cannot be challenged on antitrust grounds, provided it does 
not go below cost.”)  In some instances, this may be a function of a belief that there is no realistic 
alternative.  See e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 314-15 (“Until antitrust tribunals are able to identify 
above cost prices as anticompetitive in a reliable manner, a consumer-oriented antitrust policy has no 
choice but to adhere to the admittedly underdeterrent below cost pricing requirements of the Areeda-
Turner or some similar rule.”).  If so, it confirms the preoccupation with classification to the detriment 
of demonstrable economic effects.  What does the evidence show is the economic impact of conduct?  
That should be the question – not what is the relationship between price and cost.   
 107. Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054. 
 108. Elhauge is of the view that “the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the proposition that 
above-cost pricing can be predatory.”  Elhauge, supra n. 16, at 318.  Circuit courts apparently do not 
see that so clearly.  See Shores, supra n. 9. 
 109. See e.g. Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories 
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 738 (1981) (for predatory pricing); Easter-
brook, supra n. 63 (for antitrust in general); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“Yet where the Chi-
cago School tended to advocate per se legality, post-Chicago thinking enthuses over rule of reason 
analyses.”); Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1582 
(1983) (for mergers); Joskow & Klevorick, supra n. 7 (for predatory pricing); William E. Kovacic & 
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43 
(2000); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylva-
nia Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977) (for vertical restraints).  As Kauper has noted in connection 
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The broad teaching of Supreme Court jurisprudence provides a founda-
tion for demonstrable economic effect being a guide to all antitrust 
cases.110  Economic theory should not be excluded from consideration,111 
but it should not be the “end all, be all.”112  Rule of Reason analysis will 
ensure that novel practices, and practices that do not fit into any neat clas-
sification, will be captured if they are anticompetitive.113  By focusing on 
demonstrable economic effects based on the evidence presented, courts and 
juries will be more able to distinguish between anticompetitive low prices 
and procompetitive low prices.114 
Further, a Rule of Reason approach based on demonstrable economic 
effects will give business an opportunity to justify its conduct – prove that 
it’s procompetitive – thus increasing certainty and the range of permissible 
conduct.115  Though it has been said that “businesses have difficulty docu-
menting and sometimes even articulating efficiencies[,]”116 antitrust law 
should be applied so as to require it.  After all, business is in the best posi-
tion to justify its conduct – it decides to engage in it, presumably to make 
money.  If business cannot justify its conduct on competitive grounds, the 
“dog that didn’t bark” may be revealing. 
  
with leveraging and essential facilities doctrine, “greater specificity has come to be viewed by many as 
wrongheaded.”  Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1626. 
 110. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (Conduct violates Section 2 “only when it actually mo-
nopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1054 (“The broad teaching of 
Sylvania is that all antitrust analysis, not merely application of the per se rule in a particular context, 
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect.”). 
 111. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 943 (Brooke Group elements “may be sufficient to make out a preda-
tory pricing case, but they should not be necessary.”); Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 80 (“We are, 
however, convinced that economic knowledge, both theory and evidence, can provide useful guidance 
in the design of administrable legal rules. . . .”). 
 112. See Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 86 (“Economics has not identified the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for any unilateral practice to be anticompetitive.”); Shores, supra n. 9, at 1055 (“While 
relevant economic theory might be a useful tool in resolving factual issues, it should not displace fact 
analysis in the determination of economic effect.”). 
 113. See Shores, supra n. 9, at 1629 (“[A]ny reformation of standards must deal with the gestalt case, 
where liability is based on the cumulative effect of a series of acts, none of which themselves would 
satisfy Section Two’s conduct requirement.”). 
 114. See Edlin, supra n. 7, at 952 (“[T]he challenge for courts has been to find a way to distinguish 
anticompetitive low prices from procompetitive low prices.”). 
 115. Although the Rule of Reason may lack precisely defined boundaries, under it, business has the 
opportunity to show, by proof, that conduct is procompetitive.  Business need not understand the par-
ticularities of the Rule of Reason.  See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deter-
rence, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1535 (2005) (persons operate in ignorance of criminal law, but have a gen-
eral understanding).  To the extent that “[d]istinguishing procompetitive from anticompetitive actions 
with certainty is impossible[,]” Rule of Reason analysis will focus on facts – the only conceivable basis 
on which to make such distinction with any degree of legitimacy.  Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 75. 
 116. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 82. 
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Rule of Reason analysis will also limit presumptions in Section 2 
cases; presumptions that may not hold any water.117  Also, it could be used 
as a tool to mitigate the frequency with which Section 2 cases are brought 
for strategic purposes.118  To the extent that plaintiffs would have to pre-
sent concrete evidence to support a Section 2 claim, rather than simply an 
economics expert that can create an issue of fact by arguing about the ap-
propriate measure of cost, a court could more readily evaluate the record 
supporting the claim and issue sanctions in appropriate circumstances. 
Rule of Reason is the old standby.119  It has been around antitrust law 
for nearly one hundred years.120  When all else fails, courts rely on it.121  
Thus business and the courts have experience with it and are used to it,122 
which is why commentators advocate its use in contexts in which courts 
lack experience.123  The Rule of Reason’s pedigree underscores why it 
should be used in Section 2 cases. 
  
 117. See id. at 82 (arguing that “there should be no presumption on the part of competition authorities 
that . . . practices are anticompetitive, even when undertaken by firms with monopoly power”). 
 118. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & 
Econ. 247 (1985); Crane, supra n. 30, at 8; Kauper, supra n. 8, at 1624 (Since Section 2 cases are likely 
to be brought by competitors, “one could argue that the cases themselves are potentially anticompeti-
tive.”).   
 119. See e.g. FTC v. Ind. Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (applying rule of reason 
instead of per se rule when the restraint’s effect is not immediately ascertainable). 
 120. Stand. Oil, 221 U.S. 1. 
 121. See Broad. Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (explaining when Rule of Reason will ap-
ply); Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law 143 (Law. ed., West 1985) (same); 
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 
Yale L.J. 373, 464 (1966) (same).   
 122. See e.g. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44 (noting Court conclusively presumes restraint unreason-
able when experience allows confident prediction Rule of Reason would condemn); Ernest Gellhorn, 
Antitrust Law and Economics In A Nutshell 6-9 (1976) (historical development of Rule of Reason); 
Peter Nealis, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication Under the Rule of Reason, 61 
Ohio St. L.J. 347 (2000); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A 
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1991) (noting that courts have 
significant experience with the Rule of Reason in vertical contexts); but see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., 
Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1753, 1754 (1994) (opining that “the modern rule of reason has no substantive content” and that 
because plaintiffs are reluctant to bring rule of reason suits, the federal courts have little experience in 
applying it). 
 123. See e.g. Jennifer L. Dauer, Political Boycotts: Protected by the Political Action Exception to 
Antitrust Liability or Illegal Per Se?, 28 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 1273, 1307-08 (1995) (noting that courts 
could easily apply Rule of Reason to mixed-motive boycotts since courts have extensive experience 
with Rule of Reason); Charles D. Marvin, Baseball’s Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball 
Cap Doesn’t Fit, 43 Kan. L. Rev. 625 (1995) (challenge to baseball’s salary cap likely to be evaluated 
under the Rule of Reason); Howard Morse, Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes in the Pharma-
ceutical and Medical Device Industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 359, 361, 367 (2002) 
(arguing for a rule of reason approach because courts lack experience with exclusion payments). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Predatory pricing law, in its current form, relies too heavily on eco-
nomic theory to the exclusion of competitive facts.124  As a result, preda-
tory pricing claims have almost been read out of the antitrust laws.125  But 
the current predatory pricing standard does not deliver on its promises of 
certainty or enhancing competition.126   
Commentators have for a long time suggested that modern theory will 
solve the riddle of Section 2, but “we have seen very little progress in the 
theoretical literature that would help regulators and courts separate pro-
competitive from anticompetitive behavior.”127  The lack of progress flows 
from too much complication.  Courts and commentators should refocus on 
Sherman Act fundamentals, for as Justice Holmes explained: “The life of 
the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”128  If the Sherman Act 
is the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,”129 and “[i]f the goal of antitrust is 
consumer welfare, then the inquiry should focus on that goal, not on 
whether a firm is maximizing profits in the short run.”130  The appropriate 
tool for conducting such an inquiry is the Rule of Reason.  Although preda-
tory pricing law – and the law governing Section 2 generally – may be a 
‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ enterprise[,]”131 the damning 
should be a function of evidence, where business has the full opportunity 
to justify the procompetitive results of its conduct, not on theory.  
 
  
 124. See Shores, supra n. 9, at 1056 (opining that “the Court has gone too far in determining eco-
nomic effect by relying on abstract economic principles.”). 
 125. See id. at 1085. 
 126. See e.g. Crane, supra n. 30, at 44 (“The structure of predatory pricing law does not provide 
business executives a high degree of certainty about the legal reception of price cuts.”); Edlin, supra n. 
7, at 941 (“Brooke Group was no great day for consumers, for well-functioning markets, or for antitrust 
law.”). 
 127. Evans & Padilla, supra n. 12, at 98 (referencing Kovacic & Shapiro, supra n. 109, at 58-59). 
 128. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881). 
 129. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 415. 
 130. Edlin, supra n. 7, at 978. 
 131. Crane, supra n. 30, at 65. 
